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ABSTRACT: In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies 
fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about 
how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is 
determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. 
The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical. 
 
KEYWORDS: equivocation, informal fallacies, logic, translation problem, tu quoque 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As philosophers we spend much of our time considering arguments as 
constellations of propositions and trying to work out the various logical relations 
between them. This has been criticized as being detached from the social reality of 
argumentative exchanges and has led to an increasingly antagonistic attitude 
towards formal logic combined with an evangelical zeal towards a conception of 
argumentation and, for some, of reasoning itself as something inherently dialogical. 
According to this fashionable trend fallacies are not logical errors but are intelligible 
only dialogically and analysable only in a dialectical model. 
This, I believe, is an altogether exaggerated claim. It is not that I object to any 
particular model, but one must beware of drawing conclusions about what is being 
modelled from features of the model.1 We can model deductive relations as moves 
in a dialogue and fallacies as those moves that are prohibited by the rules of 
dialogue, but we cannot conclude from this alone that they are not logical errors and 
                                                 
1 This is a mistake that empirical scientists never make but philosophers are prone to. No scientist, 
for instance, concludes from the usefulness of the model of statistical mechanics that the underlying 
phenomena are inherently statistical; it is entirely consistent with the model that the statistical 
effects it deals with are the result of interactions that are themselves governed by laws of mechanics 
that are non-statistical and entirely deterministic in nature. Conversely, the fact that a model does 
not mention probabilities and is, perhaps, qualitative, does not imply that what is being modelled is 
similarly non-probabilistic and non-quantitative. This observation undercuts those attempts to show 
that there are arguments that are not deductive or inductive and consequently norms of arguments 
beyond deductive and inductive validity, for even if we concede that there are distinct models we do 
not need to concede that there is a distinct normativity going along with each such model. The 
usefulness of such models is more descriptive than normative. 
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that it is not their logical defectiveness that accounts for their badness as arguments. 
The normativity is logical, regardless of how we may choose to model it. 
What I object to is not the use of dialectical models but the idea that 
arguments are inherently dialectical and that fallacies are unintelligible otherwise. 
On the contrary, the correctness of argumentation can be defined purely in 
reference to the product of argumentation, viz., the logical conception of argument. 
This does not, of course, prevent us from modelling the argumentation as a process 
governed by dialogue rules and defining correctness in relation to these rules, or 
deny that it may sometimes be more useful to consider the process than the product. 
Nor does it deny that our evaluation of the product is not also evaluation of the 
process; we can link the argument as product back to its process in that we can see 
argumentative moves as assertive speech-acts whose propositional contents are 
those propositions whose logical inter-relations we are trying to model for eventual 
evaluation.  
More than this, the pragma-dialectical approach allows us to see 
argumentation itself as a complex speech-act whose conditions of satisfaction 
require resolving disagreements through arguments that are correct in this way; i.e., 
that conform to the norms of logic. Arguers who do not desire to resolve 
disagreement by rational means but through other means such as rhetoric are 
simply not arguing (this does not rule out the possibility that a particular piece of 
argumentation may be both rational and rhetorical). But this is only to say that an 
arguer does not argue rationally well, does not properly perform this speech-act, if 
she thinks that the logical product is logically defective. Whatever our conception of 
argumentation – as product, process, or procedure – its norms of correctness are the 
same. Those norms may be defined operationally by and be theoretically explicated 
by rules of dialogue but their conceptual, normative analysis is nonetheless logical 
and not dialogical or anything else. To suppose otherwise is to confuse features of 
the model with what is being modelled. 
Of course, we argue in natural language and not in the symbols of logic. 
Consequently, there is always a problem of getting from what is uttered to the 
speech-act, e.g, of assertion. This is the problem of interpretation or translation. 
Interpretation is chronologically prior to logical appraisal,2 certainly, but this does 
not represent any kind of defect in logic such that we must reject or restrict the 
scope of logic. To reject logic because it “ignores context” is misguided, a mistaken 
consequence drawn from the true observation that the difficult part is often 
determining the logical form and not in deciding whether the form is valid. None but 
the most ingenuous of logicians would deny that in solving this difficulty reference 
must be made to contextual information. This would not need saying if it weren’t for 
the fact that some philosophers like Gilbert (1997) argue that some argumentation 
such as those where emotions are expressed require a different, non-logical 
normativity and seems furthermore to think that because arguments themselves are 
                                                 
2
 We always start with interpretation. However, later I will attack the idea that there is a stage of 
interpretation independent of appraisal and then a completely distinct stage of appraisal 
independent of interpretation. The relationship between the two ‘stages’ is more dynamic than this 
simple picture makes out, though I doubt whether anyone is seriously committed to this picture. 
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context-insensitive logicians must ignore any contextual information and in general 
anything that does not have the surface appearance of making a truth-claim. 
Logicians ignore neither of these things; arguments are context-insensitive because 
the context has been, so to speak, discharged in the process of interpreting the 
utterances as speech-acts and it is this that accounts for the ‘detachment’ of the 
argument. Gilbert’s accusation that logicians somehow take language to be more 
clear and less vague and ambiguous than non-linguistic means of communication 
(the so-called logocentric fallacy) is similarly a straw man, confusing the vagueness 
of the utterance with the clearness of the speech-act it has been interpreted as. An 
assertion is clear and without ambiguity. The argumentation itself may not make it 
clear which assertion is the correct interpretation, but this is a different matter. 
Deciding on what the assertions are and what their propositional contents are is, 
more or less, to decide on the logical form of the product; formalization does not 
present any significant additional difficulty beyond those encountered in speech-act 
analysis itself that we can do without by taking a non-formal approach. 
Interpreters want to pick up from the context as many clues as they can 
about what the intentions and mental states of the speaker are, and from such clues 
it is often quite appropriate to interpret an utterance that has the surface 
appearance of an expressive, for instance, as an assertive: “I love you” might in most 
contexts be an expressive but in the context of giving you reasons to marry me it is 
an assertive, and whether the reasons I give for you to marry me are conclusive or 
provide some weaker support is a matter of logic and to be assessed against the 
norms of logic, namely deductive (and perhaps inductive) validity. Gilbert is wrong 
to suggest that we need to appeal to a completely different norm to evaluate arguing 
in this “mode.” Just as it is appropriate in the context of exchanging reasons to 
interpret expressive and physical gestures as assertives, I will argue that sometimes 
it is appropriate to interpret what looks like an assertive, and perhaps even is an 
assertive from the speaker’s point of view, in a different kind of way as trying to 
affect the interpretation by giving contextual information (or perhaps 
misinformation) that problematizes how a certain utterance is to be translated. I 
wish to explain our feeling that sometimes the informal fallacies are not fallacious or, 
if fallacious, are not fallacious because irrelevant, as being due to the fact that 
informal fallacies could be interpreted as giving contextual information. When 
interpreted in this way, what follows is not that the argument is good or bad, but 
simply that the argument is not what we thought it was, and perhaps in some cases 
is not an argument at all. It leads us back into the interpretation stage and out of the 
stage of logical evaluation. 
The fallacy could be interpreted in this way, or it could be interpreted in the 
traditional way as a fallacy of relevance. The interpreter is not compelled to 
interpret one way rather than the other – it is not that one interpretation is 
legitimate and the other illegitimate. Thus, there is no fact of the matter 
independently of the interpreter’s decision whether a fallacy of relevance has been 
committed, and this explains how we may have conflicting intuitions on the subject. 
This decision boils down to whether the interpreter wishes to be charitable to the 
one committing the fallacy – in which case he will obviously not charge them with 
being irrelevant – or to the other.  
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In justifying her decision, the interpreter may appeal to one of two principles 
of interpretation that may give conflicting verdicts, and again, it is not that one of 
these principles is better than the other absolutely, though I will claim that they are 
better with regard to certain purposes the interpreter may have. This is not unlike 
the situation with regard to the Principle of Charity and suppressed premises; using 
a strong version of the Principle of Charity we would use as a suppressed premise 
whatever makes the argument strongest whether or not we think that the arguer 
has such a premise in mind, and using a weaker version of the Principle of Charity 
we would restrict ourselves to what can be plausibly attributed to the arguer 
himself. This reflects different aims: if we wish to critically test the argument and 
give it the severest possible test, then the strong version is more suited, but if we 
wish to evaluate the arguer’s performance as an arguer then the weak version is 
more suited. It is only relative to one of these aims that there is a fact of the matter 
what the suitable principle of interpretation is and hence what the suppressed 
premise is and similarly whether a fallacy has been committed. 
I will illustrate such an interpretative decision by giving the example of 
equivocation. The question I wish to ask is: given that all ambiguities are resolved in 
the process of interpretation, how does equivocation ever occur? What does it mean 
to say that it has occurred? This turns out to be a more difficult question than it 
appears. It will be shown that they only occur if an interpretation is given to the 
utterance that depends not only on the mental states of the speaker but also on the 
epistemic states of the interpreter. To a certain extent there is no fact of the matter 
whether an equivocation has been committed but a decision by the interpreter to 
interpret it as a mistake that amounts to a choice between principles of 
interpretation. Informal fallacies (except for argumentum ad ignorantiam which I 
take to be a logical error irrespective of interpretation) are mistakes only relative to 
this choice and are problematic because they give rise to what I call an interpretative 
dilemma. 
 
2. INTERPRETATIVE DILEMMAS AND EQUIVOCATION 
 
Suppose Peter offered Paul the following argument: 
 
Bakers make lots of dough 
People who make lots of dough make lots of money 
Therefore, bakers make lots of money 
 
We, as onlookers, would say that the conclusion does not follow because of 
equivocation between two senses of “dough” in the two premises, which is to say 
that we would give the logical form of the argument in quantificational and 
Aristotelian logic respectively as: 
 
x. IsABaker(x)  MakesLotsOfDough1(x)   All A are B1 
x. MakesLotsOfDough2(x)  MakesLotsOfMoney(x) All B2 are C 
Therefore, 
x. IsABaker(x)  MakesLotsOfMoney(x)   All A are C 
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Were B1 and B2 the same, obviously we would have a perfect syllogism; however, 
our use of different symbols (here the subscripts 1 and 2) means that B1 and B2 are 
not the same, resulting in a syllogism with four terms that is self-evidently invalid. 
This is normally called the fallacy of four terms. It is normally said of a fallacy 
that it is an argument that looks valid but is not, but the reconstructions above do 
not even look valid, and if Paul showed this reconstruction to Peter it is quite 
possible that Peter would say “Well, that’s obvious! That’s not what I meant at all! I 
meant “dough” as in that stuff you make bread out of. What else can “dough” mean?” 
In this scenario Peter is quite unaware that “dough” is a slang word for “money” and 
consequently the argument he gives is, in fact, the perfect syllogism. How, then, can 
we say that Peter has equivocated or argued badly? 
By deciding that Peter’s argument contains an equivocation the analyst 
performing the reconstruction has introduced a second meaning that Peter himself 
is quite unaware of, and in doing so he has gone beyond the communicative 
intentions of the speaker as a resource for determining the logical form. So 
reconstructed the argument does not equivocate because in distinguishing the two 
terms the analyst has removed the ambiguity. But nor can it be said that Peter has 
equivocated, because he is using the ambiguous term in the one and only sense that 
he is aware of. What is more, if Peter does know both senses it is difficult to see how 
Peter can equivocate if he is arguing sincerely and not deliberately trying to mislead, 
and if he is not sincere then he is not satisfying the conditions of satisfaction of an 
assertion (he is not asserting his premises but only pretending to) or the conditions 
of satisfaction of argumentation if this is defined, as in pragma-dialectics, as rational. 
In short, Peter would not be arguing at all because it would be self-evident to Peter 
that the argument he was offering is formally invalid. 
Suppose that Paul now tries to tell Peter of his mistake. What can he do? If he 
simply presents it as a statement of fact, then he is making an appeal to authority, 
claiming himself, or perhaps a dictionary, to be experts on the meanings of words. 
Peter may quite reasonably respond “Why should I believe you? And even if I do, 
you still would not have refuted my argument.” Paul may respond, “Well, I can prove 
it in so far that on my reading of “dough” your second premise is true by definition, 
whereas on your reading of “dough” it is false. Why do you think that it is true?” To 
this Peter may respond, “Patricia told me that people that make lots of dough make 
lots of money. I am justified, then, in thinking it to be true.” If Paul now responds 
that Patricia meant “dough” in the slang sense when she said this, then the argument 
has simply turned in a circle. The only way for Paul to convince Peter is to give a 
counter-example, e.g., he might say “Look at Luigi down at Dominos. He makes lots 
of dough but he still lives with his mother and drives an old car.” In doing so, Paul 
undercuts Peter’s entitlement to assert the premise and conclusion, but does not 
show Peter to have equivocated. So no equivocation is mentioned in this approach 
either. Peter’s argument is valid but unsound, having a false premise. In this way the 
fallacy of equivocation becomes like a quantifier-shift fallacy: for each premise there 
is a sense of the ambiguous term that makes the premise true, but there is no sense 
for which both premises are true.  
But imagine the following scenario: it is true that all bakers and makers of 
dough make lots of money. In this possible if unlikely situation the premises are true 
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and the conclusion is true, Peter is justified in believing his premises, in believing 
they are relevant to his conclusion, and Paul cannot produce any counter-examples 
because there are none. Peter’s argument is both valid and sound. Yet, as onlookers 
we would still claim that Peter’s argument is mistaken, and this is to be explained by 
the fact that the evidence that Peter takes to objectively justify his claim in his own 
sense of “dough” does not actually objectively justify it; if Patricia’s testimony is his 
evidence, the evidence objectively justify his claim in the other sense of “dough” 
because this is what Patricia meant. Peter is mistaken about his justification, but this 
does not prevent him from being subjectively justified, that is to say, justified from 
his own point of view, and this makes the claim assertible for Peter. 
The upshot of this is that there is no equivocation or any other mistake if the 
interpretation takes the point of view that the only thing that matters is the arguer’s 
entitlement to assert his premises and conclusion, where the conclusion is 
supported as Peter supports his conclusion. In deciding that a mistake is committed, 
it follows that the interpreter does not take this point of view but an ‘objective’ point 
of view where objectively good reasons for making a truth-claim are given priority 
over the arguer’s entitlement to assert them. Neither arguments nor (in the 
standard cases) arguers equivocate; the only equivocation left is between these two 
points of view, and this is less an equivocation than a dilemma. The use of 
ambiguous terms raises problems in analysing the argumentation, but actually plays 
no role at all in the normative appraisal of the argumentation, which is settled 
instead by a decision followed by ordinary logical evaluation. 
I need to say more (though of a somewhat vague nature) about these two 
points of view. When we take a piece of argumentative dialogue and analyse its 
structure, there is more than one aim that we may have in mind. We may wish to get 
at the truth, in which case we will analyse the dialogue in such a way as to provide 
the strongest possible reasons for the standpoint, even if we have reason to believe 
that this is not exactly what the opponent has in mind. These are the severest tests 
of the standpoint and should be what we are interested in if we want to get at the 
truth.3 This suggests a particular principle of interpretation that I will call the 
Objective Principle, and it is characterized by the fact that it is not always 
unreasonable to attribute to an arguer an argument that he did not make provided 
that the argument so attributed is stronger. It is a principle of charity in the sense 
that we do not attribute to the speaker claims we ourselves know to be false or 
unjustified even if our contextual evidence indicates that this is, in fact, what the 
speaker meant. 
Alternatively, we may be less interested in the truth of the standpoint than its 
assertibility for the arguer. If so, then we must forget everything that we know as 
                                                 
3
 As an example, in his attack on Marxism Popper is careful not to attack any naïve or vulgarized 
version of Marxism but goes back to Marx’s actual claims and even strengthens those claims where 
possible so that his critical attack, when he launches it, attacks core tenets of Marxism that are 
fundamental to all its variants. Also, despite the fact that the proponent may conceive of his 
argumentation as only inductive and not conclusive, the analyst may be able to see that the argument 
qua product is deductively valid, establishing its conclusion conclusively, and reconstruct the 
argument in this stronger way. 
DAVID BOTTING 
7 
analysts with regards to the truth of the claims made, whether they are objectively 
justified, and the actual inferential relations between them and confine ourselves 
solely to what we think is assertible for the arguer and how he intends his 
argumentation to support his standpoint. Something is assertible when the speaker 
takes himself to be justified in believing the propositional content of his assertion. It 
should be noted that the notion of justification in play here is justification from the 
arguer’s own point of view, and quite obviously a person can be mistaken about 
their justification. They can be subjectively but not objectively justified, but the 
analyst must in this circumstance, adopting a Subjective Principle of interpretation 
where it is the assertibility of the premises and their believed relevance to the 
conclusion that counts, put aside the fact that he himself knows the speaker to be 
objectively unjustified and that the premises have different or stronger inferential 
relations to the conclusion than the arguer thinks, if they do. 
Although I speak frequently of a choice between these two principles, this 
should not be read as implying that one or the other is used exclusively or to imply 
that there is always a conflict between them. These principles interact with the 
context and with each other and will often give the same results, since generally 
speaking people are not mistaken about their justification or about what their best 
reasons are. However, in the case of equivocation we have to make a choice, and this 
is not confined only to equivocation. In my view, all of the ad fallacies (except for the 
argumentum ad ignorantiam) raise what I call interpretative dilemmas. Interpreted 
under the Subjective Principle alone will give us a deductively invalid argument 
because of the irrelevance of the argumentation. Interpreted under an Objective 
Principle, accusing arguers of arguing irrelevantly should be seen as uncharitable 
and suggests that, even though the argumentation may appear to be assertive and to 
be making truth-claims, the arguer’s utterances can more charitably be interpreted 
in a different way that I will describe. 
Before treating of the ad fallacies it is necessary to show exactly why the 
traditional fallacies extra dictionem as they are given in Aristotle do not raise 
interpretative dilemmas and do correctly reconstruct the arguer as arguing 
mistakenly. It is just about imaginable that a thinker may be subjectively justified in 
taking any pattern of inference at all to transmit justification in the absence of a 
counter-example, especially those that exemplify fallacies extra dictionem. But the 
point now is that for these fallacious patterns there always is such a counter-
example, and furthermore the thinker has a priori knowledge of such counter-
examples – they must only be pointed out to him in order to demand his assent. In 
other words, the thinker only took himself to be subjectively justified when he 
actually was not, this false appearance being brought about only by a kind of 
doxastic akrasia where he considered only a subset of what he knew. It is only 
because of this possibility that the scenario is even imaginable; otherwise it is 
incoherent.4 
                                                 
4
 The derivation of an absurd consequence such as anything being derivable from anything – as can 
easily be shown with respect to a ‘logical’ connective like tonk – can be thought of here as a counter-
example. The point is that the thinker becomes aware that the inference rule he is using is self-
evidently and logically inconsistent with other things he knows. Although the thinker is never 
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3. INTERPRETATIVE DILEMMAS AND THE INFORMAL FALLACIES 
 
The ad fallacies are typically classified as fallacies of relevance, but much depends 
on exactly what the arguer is arguing and many of the examples are under-
described. The arguer may argue that such and such are reasons for some 
standpoint’s being true or false. But this is not the most charitable way of 
reconstructing the argumentation when it has been challenged by a “fallacious” 
move, and on a more objective view we will view the argument not as asserting or 
making a truth-claim about something but as prescribing something, as making a 
demand of a certain type, e.g, to be taken as an epistemic authority. It is not a 
demand to believe something, for this would amount to a pragmatic contradiction – 
“believe” is not an action-verb and is not a possible object of demand. The same 
applies if that which is demanded is impossible, as will be shown in the case of the 
fallacy of many questions. These are not felicitous demands. What is demanded in 
such arguments is to act as if something were true. 
The conditions of satisfaction of a demand are different from those of an 
assertion. In particular, it must be agent-neutral. It is incoherent to demand of 
another that which one does not demand of oneself or to hold another to demands 
that one routinely ignores – the demand must apply to all relevantly similar 
situations. When Paul says “Do not smoke” he could be interpreted as asserting 
“Smoking is bad for you” – and since this is common knowledge it is a reasonable 
interpretation – but he might also be interpreted as having committed an expressive 
rather than an assertive, e.g., as expressing disapproval of smoking. Expressives lack 
cognitive significance but this does not mean that they cannot ground a prescription 
or be simultaneously an instance of a felicitous demand (one and the same utterance 
may instantiate different speech-acts, even those of different types), but a felicitous 
demand does not necessarily follow, especially when the speaker does the very thing 
he is expressing disapproval of. This amounts to a counter-example in the context of 
a demand. In this case we might interpret the disapproval as mere disapproval or 
we might interpret it as a demand whose felicity is altogether questionable. This is 
why there is thought to be something unreasonable about the smoker who tells 
others not to smoke – they are not in a position to make such a demand, although 
they certainly may be in a position to assert that smoking is bad for you. 
If Paul’s utterance of “Do not smoke” is interpreted as an assertion then 
Peter’s response “But you smoke!” is a fallacy of relevance, but if Paul’s utterance is 
interpreted as a demand then the complaint is a valid one. Here the analyst is faced 
with a double dilemma. Does he take the fact that Paul is doing the very thing he 
expresses disapproval of as contextual information that Paul is not in fact sincere? 
Then “Do not smoke” is not assertible for Paul and Paul’s utterance is translated as 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually justified, even subjectively, in believing the result of an invalid inference step, the converse 
does not follow that the thinker is always objectively justified in believing the result of a valid 
inference step, for we may suppose that belief in the valid rule is subjectively justified on unreliable 
grounds and not by what objectively justifies it; even unreliable testimony will be right sometimes. 
See Botting (2011b). 
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an infelicitous assertion. This is a rather strong way to interpret Paul’s smoking, 
which in this particular case (though perhaps less so in others) is really rather weak 
evidence of insincerity, especially given the established facts that smoking is 
addictive and is bad for you. It is not likely that Paul has any real doubts or makes 
any factual mistake concerning the demerits of smoking. Thus, neither principle 
really supports this interpretation for this example. 
If instead the interpreter wants to analyse Paul’s argumentation so that it 
favours Paul then he will likely interpret it as a felicitous assertion despite his 
smoking, but in doing so he ipso facto takes the opposite view towards Peter’s 
counter-argumentation, which is now simply irrelevant. On the other hand, if he 
analyses Peter’s counter-argumentation so as to make it relevant and as strong as 
possible then he will likely interpret Paul’s utterance as a demand and be led to 
consider that such a demand is not felicitous because Paul is trying to hold Peter to a 
demand that he does not hold himself to. This is the interpretation Peter wants; he 
does not want Paul’s utterance to be interpreted as mere disapproval because then 
the tu quoque response is inappropriate, taking Paul to be giving reasons when he is 
not. The tu quoque response thus seems less a response to the other’s 
argumentation rather than as a kind of inducement, by providing contextual 
information or misinformation, to resolve the interpretative dilemma in his own 
favour. 
Let us consider now the argumentum ad verecundiam. Suppose that we have 
evidence that a particular expert’s utterances are not likely to be true. There are two 
things we could do with this evidence: we could take it as reason not to believe the 
expert’s assertions, or alternatively we could take it as reason not to interpret the 
expert’s utterances as assertions. Interpreting under the Subjective Principle there 
is (we assume) no reason to suppose that the utterance is not literally an assertion. 
Under the Objective Principle, however, we would not want to attribute to the 
speaker beliefs that are false or unjustified. This is analogous to how Peter’s 
equivocation was analysed – we attributed to Peter a sense of the ambiguous term 
that he was not in fact aware because of what we, as onlookers, knew to be 
objectively justified by the evidence Peter had. The negative evidence induces an 
interpretation where the expert is making a prima facie demand that his claims 
should be taken to be true because given by an expert, and there is no reason to 
suppose this demand to be infelicitous even if we do not in fact take his claims to be 
true. The argumentation becomes a way of saying that there is a reason for thinking 
something to be true, and there is such a reason, albeit one that would be defeated 
in the light of negative evidence, and to be in possession of such reasons is a part of 
what it means to be an expert. In this case the demand can be construed as a 
materially valid practical argument. Given enough negative evidence, the conclusion 
to be drawn is that the expert was not really an expert at all; it goes without saying 
that appealing to experts or to authority is mistaken if it is believed that those 
appealed to lack expertise or authority. 
Circumstantial ad hominem arguments are similar to ad verecundiam 
arguments. Here, both subjective and objective principles of interpretation cast 
doubt on whether the arguer’s utterances should be taken as assertions. This is 
because, in the situation where the speaker does not believe his claim to be true, or 
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does not take his belief to be well-justified, he is likely to make the utterance as if it 
were an assertion anyway. Evidence, e.g., of bias, is contextual information that is 
relevant to how the argumentation should be interpreted. 
Ad populum arguments are similar to ad verecundiam arguments. Whereas ad 
verecundiam arguments appeal to authorities and experts whose authority – 
deriving usually from social institutions – accounts for the force of the demands 
they make, ad populum arguments appeal to public opinion. But public opinion does 
not seem to have the same force. The one who appeals to public opinion seems to be 
adopting a dual strategy. Because many believe something to be true there is a good 
chance that it is true (provided that they are in a position to know), so the arguer 
does make a truth-claim, but perhaps he is not altogether convinced that the claim is 
true and realizes that by “following the crowd” he protects himself from criticism, 
because to any such criticism he has the ready-made tu quoque reply “You too!”5 The 
main goal of such argumentation is avoiding criticism rather than determining the 
truth. 
What goes wrong with the ad baculum fallacy is that those who commit it 
replace genuine authority with brute force; their demands are never felicitous. It is a 
degenerate form of ad verecundiam and raises no genuine interpretative dilemma 
because it quite obviously does not satisfy the conditions of either an assertion or a 
demand. However, there is one way to interpret ad baculum as valid and that is 
when it concludes assertively that you would be better off if you believed something. 
And indeed, this argumentation is perfectly correct – you would be better off. Of 
course, one cannot voluntarily believe something because one would be better off 
doing so. As mentioned above, if the conclusion is a prescription actually to believe 
something because you would be better off or for whatever reason, then the 
argumentation is a kind of pragmatic contradiction. 
What about argumentum ad misericordiam? Typically, it seems wrong to 
interpret these kinds of moves as claiming to be arguing for the truth of something, 
or indeed as functioning argumentatively at all; rather, they claim that being true is 
a goal that should in these particular circumstances be superseded by another goal. 
There is usually no real disagreement or argument here, but merely the making 
salient of a conflict in goals. This is a demand, and it seems to me that the demand 
can be felicitous (which does not mean that it should be acceded to). Can we argue 
about goals or values? According to Hume we cannot rationally compare goals. 
However, when we have goals in common we can argue that more of the more 
important goals will be satisfied if the goal of truth is sacrificed than otherwise. 
Thus, every argumentum ad misericordiam implies an argumentum ad 
consequentiam. Such consequences are irrelevant from the point of view of 
theoretical arguments aimed at truth, but the argumentation is not here interpreted 
as claiming otherwise (although it cannot be ruled out that the arguer may have 
thought that her argumentation was making a truth-claim). There may be reasons 
why an interpreter is reluctant to interpret an ad misericordiam as a demand – e.g., 
the arguer appeals to an emotion that to all outward appearances she does not feel – 
                                                 
5
 Perhaps the critic is not part of the crowd. Then the criticized responds not with “You too!” but with 
“Why me?” 
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yet the ad misericordiam and ad consequentiam do not raise the kind of general 
problem for interpretation that, for instance, the circumstantial and tu quoque 
versions of the ad hominem do. 
Demands relate also to asking questions. Usually it is assumed that if an 
arguer has been asked a question then this is tantamount to a felicitous demand for 
an answer. This is usually described as shifting the burden-of-proof. But if the 
demand is infelicitous there is no such shift. The problem with the fallacy of many 
questions is that its demand is infelicitous since any attempt to comply with the 
demand would involve performative contradiction. Thus, when a man who has 
never beaten his wife is asked whether he has stopped beating his wife he should 
not answer, and it makes no sense to demand that he give an answer when no 
answer is assertible. Again, this is a degenerate case that does not raise any genuine 
interpretative dilemma because the analyst can tell from the start that the demand 
is infelicitous. This does not, I hasten to add, imply that one can never ask or answer 
such questions; after all, the answerer can voluntarily assert “Yes” if that is indeed 
the correct answer, and for that matter assert “No” if he does beat his wife. If he has 
never beaten his wife and answers “No” then this utterance is not, I would say, an 
assertion.6 The point I would wish to make is that the answerer is not obliged to 
answer at all, on the secure grounds that there can be no obligation to do the 
impossible. Or maybe the weaker thesis that the demand is not felicitous in 
precisely those cases where no answer is assertible but is felicitous in other cases is 
adequate. In either case, I do not consider the fallacy of many questions a fallacy; it 
would only be so if it were assumed that the answerer were always obliged to 
answer it, and I have argued that he is not. 
The fallacy of equivocation and of many questions, and (with the exception of 
abusive ad hominem arguments and ad ignorantiam arguments) the ad arguments 
have all been analysed. In general, the thesis is that the interpreter may interpret 
these moves as assertives, as demands, or as mere expressives with no force, and 
that he is guided in this decision by an interplay of subjective and objective 
principles of interpretation. A subjective approach will often reconstruct the 
argumentation as a theoretical argument aimed at truth, and reconstructed this way 
the ad fallacies are usually fallacies of relevance as the tradition maintains (but not 
in those cases where they provide contextual information for some proposition to 
be interpreted as having been infelicitously asserted because insincere). A more 
objective approach will balk at attributing irrelevant argumentation to arguers and 
interpret the argumentation instead as a kind of practical argument and those 
‘fallacious’ moves either as themselves making a demand and/or as providing 
contextual information that induces interpreting the previous move the ‘fallacy’ 
counters as making a demand, where these demands may or may not be felicitous. 
The ad baculum is a degenerate case where the demand is never and can never be 
felicitous; arguing ad baculum is always mistaken and does not really amount to 
                                                 
6
 As a point of logic “No”, implying the external negation of the propositional content of the question, 
is correct in the case where he has never beaten his wife. But I would deny that “No” is, in general, 
assertible for the speaker, unless he has reason to think that his answer will be understood in this 
way and not as saying that he still beats his wife. 
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arguing at all. At the other extreme, ad misericordiam and ad consequentiam seem in 
general to be felicitous demands. 
It is in the intermediary cases such as the tu quoque that the felicity of the 
demand is most problematic and the interpretative dilemma most keen. As I have 
put it above, the tu quoque seems to function less on the level of the argumentation 
itself than as a kind of inducement to interpret the argumentation in the sense of a 
practical argument where the target of the tu quoque raises an infelicitous demand. 
Being aimed at the level of the interpretation rather than the argumentation, it 
would be wrong to class these moves as fallacious or even (except the ad baculum) 
as mistakes absolutely, although they can certainly be interpreted as mistakes 
relative to a decision to interpret them as functioning in theoretical arguments in 
which ‘mistake’ is defined (correctly) in terms of deductive validity. The Standard 
Treatment that gives them the blanket accusation of being irrelevant is not wrong, 
and nor is it any defect of logic that it deals only with assertives and not with 
demands. It is simply a reminder of what everybody knew all along, which is that 
prior to logical appraisal there is a stage of interpretation where the logical form is 
to be determined. What I hope to have added is the idea that in interpreting the 
argumentation the analyst has one eye on whether, in the interpretation, something 
will be interpreted as a mistake; there is not a process of analysis and then a process 
of appraisal, but a more dynamic interrelationship where decisions about how we 
want to appraise something affect how we analyse it.7 Those ‘somethings’ are 
typically classed as informal fallacies. If he decides to interpret it as a mistake this 
feeds back into the decisions he makes and the principles he favours. This is the 
interpretative dilemma. 
What fallacies are we left with as genuine fallacies? Excluding the fallacy of 
many questions, we have Aristotle’s fallacies not depending on language, viz., the 
fallacy of accident, ignorance of refutation, ignoring qualifications, the fallacy of 
consequent, the fallacy of non-cause as cause, and the fallacy of petitio principii. 
The ad ignorantiam fallacy is basically the same as the fallacy of non-cause as 
cause. The ad ignorantiam fallacy says that failure to prove p does not amount to 
proof of not-p. There are a couple of things that could be meant by “failure to prove.” 
One is that there is a proof of p but that one has failed to find it; if the ad ignorantiam 
arguer then claims not-p she has made a rather obvious logical error, but if her claim 
is rather that the person arguing for p is not, in the absence of a proof, entitled to 
assert p or have any epistemic reason to prefer p to not-p, then the criticism seems 
quite valid. Another is that there is no proof of p from a set of propositions 
failure of p p 
causes of p if p were true and implies nothing at all (as the fallacy of non-cause as 
                                                 
7
 This is similar to Powers’ (1995, p. 312) remark that logical form is linguistic form minus fallacy 
and that the “determination of fallacy and of logical form are two sides of the same process”. One 
cannot settle the logical form first and then ask whether it is fallacious; taking something to be a 
fallacy affects what one takes to be the logical form. Powers’ comments are in the context of 
equivocation only but I take them to express a general truth about the informal fallacies. A curiosity 
of my account is that no argumentation seems interpretable as committing fallacies of equivocation 
and of relevance, at least not without accusing the arguer of incompetence or deliberate deceit. 
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p the causes of 
p 
Thus, arguing from ignorance is logically valid in such a situation, as is well known.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Fallacies are things that look like valid arguments but are not. Aristotle’s fallacies 
extra dictionem (excluding the fallacy of many questions) are fallacies and are so 
either because they are invalid or because (in the case of the fallacy of petitio 
principii) they are not arguments.8 Other fallacies like the ad fallacies are simply 
cases of ignoratio elenchi when interpreted as making truth-claims, but interpreted 
in the context of a practical argument they may be reasonable. I have tried to 
elaborate this in terms of making a demand. This is a different kind of speech-act 
from an assertive in which truth-claims are made and has different conditions of 
satisfaction, some of which, importantly, rely on objective facts about the speaker. 
Just as only people who have the authority to legalize a marriage may do so only 
people with the authority to do so may make this type of demand, and attacks on 
their person in the form of ad hominem argumentation, or appeal to their person in 
the form of ad verecundiam argumentation, is reasonable from this point of view. 
What attacks achieve when they succeed is not showing that the demand is ‘false’ in 
any sense but that the demand is infelicitous or (although this is a Pyrrhic victory) 
not really a demand but more properly translated as something without cognitive 
significance. Sometimes it cannot be taken for a demand, or at least as a felicitous 
demand. This could be because of the content, e.g., when a demand is made for a 
speech-act that cannot actually be performed in principle, such as occurs when a 
complex question whose presupposition is unsatisfied is asked, or because the 
authority backing the demand is not of the right kind, such as occurs in the ad 
baculum. I have called the problem raised by these moves interpretative dilemmas. 
They are not fallacies absolutely, but in fact function on a different level from 
argumentation as it is normally thought of; they are not concerned with exchanging 
reasons for or against a truth-claim but with providing contextual information to 
induce an interpretation or perhaps a misinterpretation of those apparently reason-
giving utterances. 
Speech-act theory only provides the vocabulary of the interpretation and has 
little to say about how to interpret and does not force any particular interpretation 
on the argumentation; this depends on principles of interpretation that may conflict 
and I doubt that there is any rule to settle the conflict.9 It must be settled instead by 
a decision of the interpreter according to whether he is more interested in truth or 
                                                 
8 This claim about petitio principii is defended in Botting (2011a). 
9
 Others disagree on this point and seem to favour exclusively subjective principles of interpretation. 
From what I have said, those who do this would be inconsistent if they also claimed that fallacies of 
relevance are not fallacious or not irrelevant, for there is generally no reason to suppose that the 
communicative intentions of the speaker is not to give a theoretical argument. Only in cases where 
the arguer can be justifiably accused of insincerity and hence of not making proper assertions might 
a move like this not be a fallacy. 
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assertibility or, we may say, in the goodness of the argument or in how well the 
arguer has argued, for these are not necessarily the same thing. This is the 
interpretative dilemma. 
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